AI Research Engineer at INRIA specializing in Large Language Models (LLMs), reinforcement learning, and causal reasoning. Building on a background in applied mathematics, I co-develop open-source procedural data generation tools and supervise undergraduate research projects. Highly motivated to leverage this expertise for a PhD position focused on Agentic AI and Kantian evolutionary game theory.
Jan 2025 - Present
Lille, France
Jan 2025 - Present
Jan 2024 - Jul 2024
Le Blanc, France
Jan 2024 - Jul 2024
2022 - 2023
Milano, Italy
2022 - 2023
2022 - 2023
2019 - 2020
Nancy, France
2019 - 2020
2020 - 2020
Nancy, France
2020 - 2020
2020-2023 M.Sc. in Statistical LearningMention: 105/110 out of 110Taken Courses:
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French graduate school of EngineeringMention: 3.6/4 out of 4Taken Courses:
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2016-2018 Classes Préparatoires aux Grandes Écoles (Mathematics and Physics track) |
An open-source Python library for generating synthetic procedural data for LLM training (SFT + RLVR). Implements structural causal models supporting observational, interventional, and counterfactual queries based on Judea Pearl’s Ladder of Causation.
A live Streamlit playground for reasoning_core: pick one of its 40 procedural task families (logic, sets, graphs, code execution, planning…), choose a difficulty level, then try to solve the generated problem yourself and get scored instantly. Source on GitHub.
Master thesis exploring the integration of Kant’s categorical imperative into evolutionary game theory. Developed a population dynamics model combining selfish gain with moral cooperation. Led to a published paper in the International Game Theory Review.
Three research projects conducted at Politecnico di Milano: Computer Vision for pulmonary disease detection, categorization of heart failure therapies, and a non-parametric statistical study on tobacco consumption trends across OECD countries.
Kant’s categorical imperative states: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” Game Theory has recently borrowed this idea from moral philosophy to introduce a new driver in strategic decisions — a motivation that adds cooperation to selfish reasoning. This paper presents a model describing the dynamics of a population whose strategies evolve not only from selfish gain, as in the replicator dynamics, but also from a moral inclination toward cooperation. We apply our model to well-known game-theoretic problems.